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of the intermediate T-T− after the first C–C bond
breakage, T− after the second C–C cleavage, and
the final product of repaired base T. The various
dissections are shown in Fig. 3, D, F, and H, and
fig. S4. Thus, we obtained the ultrafast electron
hopping of FET3 in 6, 11, and 15 ps and the
electron return after repair in 437, 2890, and
819 ps for AnPL, DmPL, and AtPL, respectively.
Knowing the total QYs (Fig. 1C), we can also
derive the second C–C cleavage in 87, 48, and 36
ps and the futile back electron transfer BET2 in
1138, 149, and 527 ps, respectively, for three PLs
(table S1).
To recapitulate, we have identified 10 elementary steps in the repair reaction by DNA photolyase, including 7 ET steps, and measured their
time scales in real time (table S1). Consequently,
we can calculate the QY of each step that contributes to the total QY (table S2). In Fig. 4, A and
B, we show the two resolved photocycles for class
I AnPL and class II AtPL, respectively, with the
corresponding reaction times of each step. For
class I PL (Fig. 4A), the two systems we studied,
AnPL and EcPL, show a dominant tunneling
pathway with the highest QYs (table S2). For
class II PL (Fig. 4B), the two systems studied
here, DmPL and AtPL, adopt mainly a two-step
hopping route, also with good repair efficiency.
For other PLs [class III CcPL and ssDNA-specific
AtPL (AtCRY3)], both tunneling and hopping
channels are operative (table S1). These detailed
dynamics and time scales for seven ET reactions
involved in repair can be used to derive microscopic pictures of various reorganization energies; their relevant reduction potentials; and,
thus, reaction driving forces (table S3) (21, 24, 25).
We did not observe clear evidence for the possible
flickering resonance for the initial electron bifurcation, as proposed recently in a theoretical
study (26).
Figure 4C shows the repair QYs along the
evolutionary path from the microbial class I to
the eukaryotic class II PLs, with initial electron
bifurcation into the tunneling route FET2 and
the hopping path FET1 and their resulting QYs
(QY2 and QY1). Clearly, the tunneling route in
class I leads to a higher repair QY. With the
decrease in the rates of tunneling, the hopping
channel comes to dominate in class II PLs. Consequently, class II PLs can never reach the class I
repair QY because the electron path at Ade−
also bifurcates into the repair channel to the
CPD and the futile path back to the original
ground state, both of which share similar hopping rates. The conserved active-site configuration and the folded flavin structure that occur
as a result of evolution in the entire photolyasecryptochrome superfamily (11–15, 27–30) are essential to ensure a unified electron-transfer mechanism
through electron path bifurcation into two operative routes for all CPD photolyases.
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INFLUENZA

Role for migratory wild birds
in the global spread of avian
influenza H5N8
The Global Consortium for H5N8 and Related Influenza Viruses*†
Avian influenza viruses affect both poultry production and public health. A subtype H5N8 (clade
2.3.4.4) virus, following an outbreak in poultry in South Korea in January 2014, rapidly spread
worldwide in 2014–2015. Our analysis of H5N8 viral sequences, epidemiological investigations,
waterfowl migration, and poultry trade showed that long-distance migratory birds can play
a major role in the global spread of avian influenza viruses. Further, we found that the
hemagglutinin of clade 2.3.4.4 virus was remarkably promiscuous, creating reassortants
with multiple neuraminidase subtypes. Improving our understanding of the circumpolar
circulation of avian influenza viruses in migratory waterfowl will help to provide early warning
of threats from avian influenza to poultry, and potentially human, health.
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n 2014, highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) virus of the subtype H5N8 caused
disease outbreaks in poultry in Asia, Europe,
and North America (1–3). Avian influenza
viruses are a threat both to global poultry
production and to public health; they have the
potential to cause severe disease in people and
to adapt to transmit efficiently in human populations (4). This was the first time since 2005
that a single subtype of HPAI virus had spread
over such a large geographical area and the first
time that a Eurasian HPAI virus had spread to
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North America. The rapid global spread of HPAI
H5N8 virus outbreaks raised the question of the
routes by which the virus had been transmitted.
The segment encoding for the hemagglutinin
(HA) surface protein of the HPAI H5N8 viruses is
a descendant of the HPAI H5N1 virus (A/Goose/
Guangdong/1/1996), first detected in China in
1996 (5). Since then, HPAI H5N1 viruses have
become endemic in poultry populations in several countries. The H5 viruses have developed
new characteristics by mutation and by reassortment with other avian influenza (AI) viruses, both
in poultry and in wild birds. In 2005–2006, HPAI
H5N1 spread from Asia to Europe, the Middle
East, and Africa during the course of a few months.
Although virus spread traditionally had been
14 OCTOBER 2016 • VOL 354 ISSUE 6309

213

R ES E A RC H | R E PO R TS

attributed to transport of infected poultry, infected poultry products, or HPAI-virus–contaminated
materials, several observations in the 2005–2006
epidemic suggested that wild birds also might
have carried the virus to previously unaffected
areas (6).
A HPAI H5N8 virus with genes from viruses of
the influenza A (H5N1) A/Goose/Guangdong/1/
1996 lineage was first detected in birds at live
bird markets in China in 2010 (1). This HPAI
H5N8 virus was a reassortant virus with the HA
gene segment from HPAI H5N1 virus and other
gene segments from multiple other AI viruses
circulating in eastern China (1) and is now categorized as HPAI H5 virus clade 2.3.4.4 (7). This
clade is unusually promiscuous and has been
found in combination with six different neuraminidase (NA) segments, and multiple H5Nx viruses
may be circulating at the same time and in the
same region (8, 9). The propensity of HPAI H5
virus clade 2.3.4.4 to form novel subtypes capable
of rapid, global spread is a major concern.
HPAI H5N8 virus caused a large avian influenza outbreak in poultry in South Korea in
the winter of 2013–2014 and subsequently spread
to Japan, North America, and Europe, causing
outbreaks there between autumn 2014 and spring
2015 (table S1). However, it is not clear by which
routes HPAI H5N8 virus spread so rapidly around
the world. Although there have been reports on
parts of these outbreaks (1, 2, 10) and speculation
on possible routes of transmission (3), no comprehensive global analysis has yet been performed.
The goal of this study was to analyze the
available genetic, epidemiological, and ornithological data for evidence of the relative contributions from poultry trade and from wild bird
movements (3, 6) for the global spread of clade
2.3.4.4 during 2014–2015. For this purpose, we
performed phylogeographic analysis of HPAI
H5N8 viruses detected in wild birds and poultry
from this global outbreak. In addition, we analyzed migration patterns of wild birds found infected with HPAI H5N8 virus, epidemiological
investigations of HPAI H5N8 virus outbreaks,
and poultry-trade records from countries where
HPAI H5N8 virus was reported (11).
Initial phylogenetic analysis was performed
using HA sequences from HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4
viruses of poultry and wild birds from around
the world between 2004 and 2015, including subtypes H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N5, H5N6, and
H5N8. From 2004 to 2012, clade 2.3.4.4 viruses
were circulating predominantly in Eastern Asia
(China), with some transmission to Southeastern
Asia (Fig. 1 and fig. S1). During this period, transmission involving domestic anseriformes (ducks
and geese) appears to dominate, although some
contribution from domestic galliformes (chickens and turkeys) and short-distance migratory
wild birds (e.g., mallard ducks) is also evident
(Fig. 1). Unlike H5 segments from other clades,
which are mostly found as H5N1, the HPAI H5
segment of the clade 2.3.4.4 viruses reassorts
frequently, acquiring NA segments from cocirculating low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI)
subtypes, including N5 (from 2006 to 2010), N2
214
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(from 2008 to 2012), N8 (from 2010), and, more
recently, N6 (from 2013) (8). To indicate the host
species and regions in which the reassortments are
thought to have occurred, a reassortment measure
was calculated using the number of branches in
the posterior set of phylogenetic trees for which
the NA subtype changed while the host species
and region traits remained the same (normalized
by branch lengths). This measure suggests that
most of the observed reassortants were generated in domestic anseriformes (fig. S2), and
particularly domestic anseriformes in Eastern
Asia (China) within the time period 2004 to
2012 (fig. S3).
The time to the most recent common ancestor
(TMRCA) for the HA segment of all clade 2.3.4.4
HPAI H5N8 sequences was estimated as June 2010
[95% highest posterior density (HPD), January
to October 2010]; the TMRCA for the corresponding NA segments was similar (September 2010;
95% HPD, April to December 2010). Clade 2.3.4.4
HA H5N8 sequences were found in two subclades (Fig. 1). The smaller and earlier subclade
(a in Fig. 1) contained the first sequenced 2.3.4.4
HPAI H5N8 virus [A/Duck/Jiangsu/k1203/2010
(H5N8)]. The larger and more recent subclade
(b in Fig. 1) contained sequences from outbreaks
in South Korea and other countries included in
this study and caused multiple HPAI outbreaks
in 2014 and 2015 globally. The TMRCA of subclade
b was September 2013 for both HA (95% HPD,
July to November 2013) and NA (95% HPD, May
to November 2013). Consistent with earlier findings
(1, 10), the phylogeny indicates that HPAI H5N8
was introduced into South Korea by long-distance
migrant wild birds that acquired it from the pool
of HPAI H5 viruses circulating in domestic anseriformes in Eastern Asia (China), although we

formally cannot exclude the possibility that
HPAI H5 viruses were circulating in unsampled
locations (Fig. 1).
Distinct, well-supported clades were identified
in South Korea, likely originating in the transmission of HPAI H5N8 viruses from long-distance
migrants to other wild and domestic birds (10).
One clade (c in Fig. 1) was ancestral to the European
outbreak and another (d in Fig. 1) was ancestral
to the North American outbreak. Again, we cannot
exclude the possibility that viruses from these
subclades were present in unsampled locations.
More detailed phylogenetic analyses, using only
clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 HA sequences with location
coordinates (11), showed that the virus spread
along two main long-distance migration routes:
one from the east Asia coast/Korean peninsula,
north to the Arctic coast of the Eurasian continent, then west to Europe; and the other north
from the Korean peninsula, then east across the
Bering Strait, and south along the northwest
coast of the North American continent to Canada
and the United States (Fig. 2 and movie S1). The
reconstruction did not indicate any spread between Europe and North America. The TMRCA
for European HA segments was August 2014 (95%
HPD, July to October 2014), and September to
October 2014 (95% HPD, August to November 2014)
for the North American HA segments (table S2,
a and b). Similar results were found from analysis of the NA segments (table S2, c and d). There
were also four separate introductions into Japan,
the first estimated around February 2014 (ancestral date of single virus A/Chicken/Kumamoto/
1-7/2014), and then three more, all with TMRCAs
in October and November 2014. The sequences
from one Japanese introduction were most closely
related to sequences from Taiwan and those from

Fig. 1. Maximum clade credibility (MCC) time-scaled phylogenetic tree of multisubtype HA sequences
colored by subtype, region, and host-type traits. The clades marked a and b contain H5N8 sequences,
and c and d contain sequences from Europe and North America, respectively.The displayed MCC tree was
obtained from a posterior set of trees inferred using the Bayesian Evolutionary Analysis Sampling Trees
(BEAST) program (13) with the SRD06 nucleotide substitution model, uncorrelated relaxed clock model,
and constant population size tree prior.The branches are colored according to the most probable ancestral
trait, and ancestral traits were inferred by a symmetric (subtype and region) or asymmetric discrete trait
model (host-type) upon the posterior tree set (14). Host types are Dom-Ans (red), domestic anseriform
birds; Dom-Gal (green), domestic galliform birds; Wild-Long (blue), long-distance migratory wild birds;
Wild-Short (purple), short-distance migratory wild birds.
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another introduction to the Russian (A/Wigeon/
Sakha/1/2014) and European sequences.
The phylogenetic data were also used to infer
the ancestral host categories of the most recent
common ancestor of the European and North
American outbreak sequences, thus providing
evidence for which host type had introduced
the viruses into those areas (Fig. 3, figs. S4 and
S5, and table S2). The most likely ancestral host
category for the North American outbreak for
both HA and NA segments was long-distance
migrants (HA, 66%; NA, 84%). A similar result
was obtained for Europe (HA, 66%; NA, 70%).

Several wild bird species with known HPAI
H5N8 sequences were long-distance migrants
at different stages of their migratory cycle, depending on time and place found (table S3): Five
of the nine species found in South Korea in winter
2013–2014 were long-distance migrants at their
wintering sites or on spring migration. Both in
North America and Europe, two of the four species
found in winter 2014–2015 were long-distance
migrants at their wintering sites or on autumn
migration (11)(tables S4 and S5 and fig. S6).
The April 2014 HPAI H5N8 virus outbreak in
Japan had different characteristics from the later

outbreaks in North America and Europe. The
Japan outbreak was the only one that was contemporaneous with the outbreak in South Korea,
and no wild birds were found positive for HPAI
H5N8 virus in Japan during that outbreak.
Qualitative analysis of data from outbreak investigations on affected poultry farms in North
America, Europe, and Japan (11) (table S6) showed
that the likelihood of virus introduction via contaminated water, feed, and poultry was negligible
(Germany). Furthermore, no links between the outbreaks in one country and those in other countries
could be attributed to personnel contacts or

Fig. 2. Reconstruction of the transmission routes using phylogenetic data only from H5N8 HA sequences. At each time slice, the host-type and location
coordinates on the branches of the posterior set of phylogenetic trees are inferred and plotted as a cloud of points. The host type was inferred by discrete trait
model (as Fig. 1) (14), and the continuous location coordinates were inferred using a homogeneous Brownian motion diffusion model (15). The map projection
used is the azimuthal equal areas projection, centered on the North Pole, which is marked with a + sign. Color key as for Fig. 1; see also movie S1.
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Fig. 3. Posterior distributions of TMRCA of HA sequences from Europe and North America with
H5N8 subtype only, including host-type reconstructions, based upon a posterior set of phylogenetic trees generated as in Fig. 1. Color key as for Fig. 1.

trade of live animals, feed, or products of animal origin (Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Hungary). Many affected poultry farms
were located in areas where wild waterfowl are
abundant (Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada). Direct contact with infected wild birds (United States) or indirect
contact with materials (e.g., bedding material,
boots, and wheels of vehicles) contaminated with
wild-bird feces was considered the most likely
route of introduction into poultry holdings (United
States, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom,
and Italy). In some outbreaks, the source of infection was unknown or inconclusive (Japan and
Hungary).
We reviewed data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
(12) for 2011 to 2013 on export and import of live
domestic ducks and chickens of affected countries to estimate the risk of spread of HPAI virus
from South Korea to other countries via the international poultry trade (table S7). Data on the
export of live poultry from North Korea and
Mongolia, also in East Asia, were not available
from FAO. Although all countries (Japan, Canada,
United States, Germany, Netherlands, United
Kingdom, Italy, and Hungary) where HPAI H5N8
virus emerged between November 2014 and
February 2015 imported live chickens and live
domestic ducks in 2013, South Korea reported
the export of a low number of live chickens and
no export of live domestic ducks, although unreported cross-border trade cannot be excluded.
Nevertheless, based on these data, it seems unlikely that international trade in live poultry
played a major role in the long-distance spread
of South Korean clade HPAI H5N8 virus in
2014–2015.
Our analysis, using four different sources of
data, indicates that the main routes of large-scale
geographical spread of HPAI H5N8 virus were
most probably via long-distance flights of infected
migratory wild birds, first in spring 2014 from
South Korea or other unsampled locations in the
216
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region to northern breeding grounds and then
in autumn 2014 from these breeding grounds
along migration routes to wintering sites in North
America and Europe.
Recognition of a likely role of wild birds in the
spread of HPAI reinforces the need to improve
biosecurity on poultry farms and to exclude wild
birds from the immediate vicinity of poultry farms.
Culling wild birds and draining or disinfecting
wetlands would not be effective because these
viruses disseminate on rapid time scales over
very large distances, making reactive interventions of this kind impractical and ineffective, as
well as contravening commitments made by signatory countries to the Convention on Migratory
Species and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.
The potential role of wild birds in the circumpolar circulation of influenza viruses does point to
the need to increase our knowledge about the
connectedness at the vast circumpolar (sub)arctic
breeding areas between migratory waterfowl populations originating from different wintering areas.
Surveillance of waterfowl at the crossroads of migratory flyways to wintering areas in Europe, Asia,
and North America would inform epidemiological
risk analysis and provide early warning of specific HPAI threats to poultry, and potentially
human, health.
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How economic, humanitarian, and
religious concerns shape European
attitudes toward asylum seekers
Kirk Bansak,1,2* Jens Hainmueller,1,2,3*† Dominik Hangartner2,4*
What types of asylum seekers are Europeans willing to accept? We conducted a conjoint
experiment asking 18,000 eligible voters in 15 European countries to evaluate 180,000 profiles
of asylum seekers that randomly varied on nine attributes. Asylum seekers who have higher
employability, have more consistent asylum testimonies and severe vulnerabilities, and are
Christian rather than Muslim received the greatest public support. These results suggest that
public preferences over asylum seekers are shaped by sociotropic evaluations of their potential
economic contributions, humanitarian concerns about the deservingness of their claims,
and anti-Muslim bias. These preferences are similar across respondents of different ages,
education levels, incomes, and political ideologies, as well as across the surveyed countries.This
public consensus on what types of asylum seekers to accept has important implications for
theory and policy.

E

urope currently faces the largest refugee crisis
since the Second World War. In 2015, Europe
received ~1.3 million new asylum claims (1),
and many more people are expected to flee to
Europe as conflicts in the Middle East and
other regions linger on. The number of migrants
trying to reach Europe via the Mediterranean Sea
who have been reported missing or dead totaled
3771 in 2015 alone (2), and this number is likely to
be higher in 2016 as asylum seekers embark on
new and even more dangerous routes to Europe
after the implementation of the refugee deal between the European Union and Turkey (3).
As more and more people flee war-torn countries
and persecution, refugee-receiving democracies
must confront a fundamental challenge: how to
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honor international commitments—including treaties
like the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention—
to process asylum claims and provide shelter to
accepted refugees, while at the same time developing asylum policies that are supported by domestic voters.
There is considerable heterogeneity in the exposure of European countries to the asylum crisis
(Fig. 1). Whereas some countries, like Germany
and Sweden, process a large number of asylum
applications per capita, others, like the United
Kingdom and Czech Republic, share a comparatively small responsibility. Yet the migrant crisis
has been so severe that it has resulted in political
conflict and social tensions widely across Europe,
including extreme right-wing parties mobilizing
citizens around asylum issues (4), frequent arson
attacks on asylum centers (5), and the partial
closing of Schengen borders.
As the crisis threatens national solidarity, the
social contract, and continental unity, European
policy-makers face increasing public pressure
to find policy solutions. Although public preferences may not always directly translate into policies, a sizable political science literature has shown
that, in democratic countries, particularly salient

31

Department of Virology, Immunobiology and Parasitology,
National Veterinary Institute, SE-751 89 Uppsala, Sweden.
Animal Health Research Institute, Council of Agriculture,
New Taipei City 25158, Taiwan.

32

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

www.sciencemag.org/content/354/6309/213/suppl/DC1
Materials and Methods
Figs. S1 to S6
Tables S1 to S10
Movie S1
References (16–59)
21 April 2016; accepted 7 September 2016
10.1126/science.aaf8852

and high-profile public policies often respond
markedly to public opinion (6–8). In the context
of this study, a case in point is the recent “Brexit”
referendum in the United Kingdom in which the
public voted for the United Kingdom to exit the
European Union, a decision that has been attributed to rising anti-immigrant backlash in the
United Kingdom (9). And whereas public opinion is a crucial factor, a key problem for both
academic scholars and policy-makers alike is a
lack of knowledge as to why some native-born
citizens oppose and others support the welcoming of particular asylum seekers.
A large literature has examined public attitudes
toward immigrants (10), ethnic minorities (11),
and Muslims (12, 13) in general, but far fewer
studies have looked at attitudes toward asylum
seekers (14–21). The latter studies have provided
important insights into the correlates of anti–
asylum seeker sentiment, but either they are limited
to particular countries or they rely on observational
data from standard survey questions that ask about
asylum seekers in general and do not use experiments to differentiate between different types of
asylum seekers (22). Furthermore, they have mostly been conducted before the current asylum crisis.
There still exists very little systematic and experimental evidence to inform the heated ongoing
political debates over asylum policies with the
voice of European voters. In particular, we lack a
comprehensive assessment that captures which
particular types of asylum seekers the European
public is willing to accept given the current crisis.
To provide such an assessment, we designed a
conjoint experiment and embedded it in a largescale online public opinion survey that we fielded
in 15 European countries (23). We used entropy
balancing (24) to reweight our sample data to
match the demographic margins from the populations of each country. Details about the sample, design, and statistical analysis can be found in
the supplementary materials (SM) (25). All analyses, except otherwise noted, were prespecified in
a preregistered analysis plan made available at
the Political Science Registered Studies Dataverse
(http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YUNKUL).
Conjoint experiments ask subjects to evaluate
hypothetical profiles with multiple, randomly varied attributes and are widely used in marketing
and, increasingly, in other social science fields to
measure preferences and the relative importance
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Materials and Methods
Sequence data
Sequence data obtained from field isolates collected from domestic and wild birds
were contributed by the partners from 16 member countries in the Global Consortium for
H5N8 Avian Influenza Viruses. The data were curated into a Global Initiative on Sharing
All Influenza Data (GISAID) workset to facilitate sharing between the partners. GISAID
promotes the sharing of all influenza type virus sequences, related clinical and
epidemiological data associated with human isolates, and geographic and species-specific
data associated with avian and other animal isolates. The GISAID workset used here
included the sequence data themselves as well as information on host species, date of
isolation and location of isolation. Publically available background sequences from
GISAID were also used, including other clade 2.3.4.4 sequences. The final data consisted
of (i) 219 HA multiple subtype sequences from 2005-2015 (ii) 130 HA H5N8 sequences
(2010-2015) and (iii) 84 NA H5N8 sequences (2010-2015); and each contained
sequences from several global regions, as well as from wild and domestic avian hosts
(Tables S8 and S9).
Phylogenetic analysis
Bayesian time-resolved phylogenetic trees were created using BEAST 1.8 (13).
Several nucleotide, molecular clock and tree prior / effective population size models were
evaluated on HA data using AICM in Tracer 1.6. The selected models were: the SRD06
nucleotide substitution model (one HKY model for codon positions 1 and 2, and another
HKY for codon position 3, both with site-site rate variation assuming 4 categories of rate
variation taken from a gamma distribution, which allows site to site rate variation ranging
from highly conserved to very variable sites), an uncorrelated relaxed clock with a lognormal distribution, and a constant population size tree prior (for the large multiple
subtype HA dataset), or skygrid flexible effective population size tree prior (for the H5N8
only datasets) (16). Three independent MCMC chains for the HA and NA H5N8 only
datasets were run, each chain consisted of 50,000,000 steps, was sampled every 5,000
steps, and the first 10% of samples discarded as burn-in. For the multiple subtype data,
four independent chains were run, the chain length was increased to 100,000,000 steps
(and sampled every 10,000) and the first 20% of samples discarded as burn-in. For each
dataset, the post-burn-in independent runs were combined, and then down sampled to
create posterior tree sets containing 1000 trees. The above MCMC settings were chosen
to achieve a post burn-in effective sample size of at least 200 in all parameters, as
recommended on the BEAST website (17), and at least two independent runs were
combined to mitigate non-convergence between runs, but in some cases we combined
four independent runs in order to achieve the best effective sample size.
Phylogenetic discrete and continuous traits models were inferred for each data set
using the posterior tree sets as input and MCMC chain lengths of 11,000 steps with
sampling every 1,000 steps. An asymmetric model was used for the Host discrete trait,
and symmetric models were used for Subtype and Region discrete traits (the choices were
made by comparing symmetric and asymmetric models using AICM in Tracer 1.6). To
perform phylogeographic diffusion with continuous spatial coordinates using
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homogeneous Brownian motion, the latitude and longitude of the sampling locations
were first transformed into a north-pole map projection using equal azimuthal areas. The
traits models were run independently over the posterior tree sets. Results from Host and
continuous spatial coordinates models (H5N8 data sets), and Host, Subtype and Region
(H5NX data set) were amalgamated (after discarding burn-in samples) for posterior tree
sets containing 1000 trees, to obtain approximately 10 multiple trait mappings on each
tree of the posterior set. In order to compare original to randomized trait reconstructions,
Host and Region discrete trait labels were permuted (100 times for host only, and 10
times for Host + Region) and run over the posterior tree sets containing 1000 trees.
Using the posterior tree sets with Host, Subtype and Region (H5NX data set)
discrete trait mappings, we identified branches where the (i) Host species and (ii) Host
species and Region, were the same at the ancestral and child nodes. To get a measure of
where reassortment was occurring, for the identified branches, we calculated the
normalized subtype changes per host (or per Host-Region) as the sum of the branch
lengths for branches where the subtype changed divided by the sum of the branch lengths
(of the identified branches). Additionally, to examine the reassortments per Host-Region,
we also calculated the normalized subtype changes for branches occurring before and
after 2012 separately.
Hosts were divided into the following categories: poultry were divided into
domestic anseriform birds and domestic galliform birds; wild birds were divided into
long-distance (listed in Table S4) and short-distance migratory birds (listed in Table S5).
To test the effect of wild bird categorisation on phylogenetic analysis, wild birds were
also examined as one group (Wild) or divided into two different groups, anseriforms
(Wild-anseriform) and other species (Wild-other) (Table S2). Subtypes were HPAI
viruses with the HA subtype 5 and NA subtypes 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, or 8. Regions were either
individual countries (Japan or South Korea) or the following regions: Eastern Asia
(China, East Russia, and Taiwan), Europe (Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands,
Sweden, and UK), North America (Canada and USA), or South Eastern Asia (Laos,
Malaysia and Vietnam). South Korea and Japan were categorized individually because
there were enough sequenced viruses to do so (>80 from South Korea, 12 from Japan)
and because of our specific interest to evaluate the assumed sources of the viruses
causing later outbreaks. Regional categorization was done after phylogenetic analysis,
which was therefore not affected by the regional categories chosen.
Epidemiological outbreak investigations
After the HPAI H5N8 outbreak in South Korea, which started in January 2014,
the virus was first detected in a chicken farm in Japan in April 2014. The origin of the
infection was unknown or inconclusive, and Japan declared freedom from HPAI from
July 2014 (18). Starting in November 2014, HPAI H5N8 virus again was detected in
Japan, in faecal samples of tundra swans (Cygnus columbianus) and of unspecified wild
ducks (Anatidae), as well as in tissues of individual sick or dead wild birds (white-naped
crane [Grus vipio], hooded crane [Grus monacha], Mandarin duck [Aix galericulata], and
mallard [Anas platyrhynchos]). In December 2014 and January 2015, several chicken
farms (broiler, broiler breeder, layer) also were infected with HPAI H5N8 virus. Again,
3

the origin of the infection was unknown or inconclusive, and Japan declared freedom
from HPAI from April 2015 (18).
Between November 2014 and February 2015, HPAI H5N8 was detected in a total
of 11 poultry farms (turkey, duck, chicken) and other holdings, as well as in a small
number of wild waterfowl, in five European countries, as well as in two mute swans
(Cygnus olor) in Sweden. In Germany, epidemiological outbreak investigations were
performed to identify potential routes of entry via water, feed, animals, people, bedding
material, other fomites (e.g., equipment and vehicles) and the presence of wild birds near
affected holdings (12, 19–22).. Virus introduction via contaminated water, feed and
poultry introduced into the farms was considered negligible in all cases, based on the
retrospective, qualitative assessment of risk factors for the introduction of HPAIV H5N8
by use of a template of the World Organisation for Animal Health for risk analysis .
Furthermore, no links between the outbreaks in Germany and those in other countries
were detected regarding person contacts or trade of live animals, feed, or products of
animal origin. In contrast, the presence of wild birds near the affected holdings was the
factor with the highest mean risk score. All outbreaks in Germany occurred in the north
of the country, and all were in areas with an abundant presence of wild waterbirds. A few
days before the outbreak in one of the three commercial poultry farms, large aggregations
of bean geese (Anser fabalis) and greylag geese (Anser anser) were observed in
surrounding pastures, and the ground around the poultry houses was notably
contaminated with bird faeces. Considerable numbers of wild waterbirds also were
observed in the vicinity of the other two commercial poultry farms. The highest risk of
virus introduction into poultry farms was considered to be indirect contact with materials
(e.g., bedding material, boots, wheels of vehicles) contaminated with wild bird faeces.
Introduction via contaminated boots or bedding material on the two turkey farms is
supported by the fact that turkeys in the poultry houses next to the entrances of the farms
were the first to be affected, and by the identification of gaps in biosecurity measures. In
the two small free-range holdings and the zoo, risk of introduction by direct contact with
wild birds was considered high.
In the Netherlands, all five affected poultry farms kept their animals indoors and
were located in areas where wild waterfowl were abundant. Epidemiological outbreak
investigations did not reveal possible dangerous contacts (e.g., professional visitors and
transport of contaminated feed or bedding material) between the affected Dutch farms
and affected farms in Germany, the U.K., or Asia, or between the affected Dutch farms
themselves, except one possible farm-to-farm transmission. The most likely route of virus
introduction was suggested to be persons wearing contaminated clothes or boots, carrying
contaminated materials or feed, or by contaminated vermin or flies (23).
The single affected poultry farm in the U.K. was located about 30 km north of the
Humber Estuary, one of the most important wetland sites in the U.K., with up to 130,000
wildfowl and waders making use of saltmarshes and mudflats during migration and
overwintering. Epidemiological investigation showed no direct connections between
affected holdings in the U.K., Germany and the Netherlands, or to the Far East. There
was no evidence of direct introduction of HPAI H5N8 virus by purchased poultry, by
4

indirect contact with contaminated people or fomites, or by importation of infected
products (e.g., feed) (24, 25).
The single affected poultry farm in Italy was located in close proximity to
wetlands and marshlands of the Po River Delta, which is one of the most populated
wintering sites for migratory birds and wild waterfowl in Italy. Results of
epidemiological investigation suggested that HPAI H5N8 virus may have been
introduced into the farm by use of litter contaminated by infected wild birds where it was
kept outside (26).
The single affected farm in Hungary was located 30 km south of the 32,000
hectare Hortobágyi National Park, where important numbers of many species of
migratory waterbirds feed and rest (27). Results of epidemiological investigation
indicated that there was no transport to the affected holding from outside Hungary, and
the source of infection was unknown or inconclusive (28).
Two out of ten mute swans found dead in central Stockholm, Sweden, were
autopsied as part of general wildlife health surveillance and found positive for HPAI
H5N8 virus. There are no commercial poultry farms in the near vicinity, and HPAI H5N8
virus was not reported in any poultry farms in Sweden (29).
Between November 2014 and July 2015, HPAI H5N8 and related HPAI H5N2
and HPAI H5N1 outbreaks were detected in poultry farms and wild birds in western and
central North America. In Canada, outbreaks occurred in poultry farms in British
Columbia and Ontario, affecting a total of 324,504 birds (18). Field epidemiological data
from the outbreaks in Canada were not available, but it was noted for one outbreak in
Ontario that wild waterfowl was present around the barns beforehand, and that HPAI
H5N8 virus was detected in a single American wigeon (18). In the USA, outbreaks
occurred in poultry farms of 15 western and central states, affecting over 48 million birds
(30), as well as a wide range of wild bird species, mainly ducks, geese, and raptors (30,
31). Based on both epidemiological and virological analyses, direct or indirect contact
with infected wild birds was considered to be responsible for initial introduction of HPAI
H5N8 and related viruses into commercial poultry in the USA. However, insufficient
application of biosecurity measures likely allowed the virus to subsequently spread
between farms in other ways, such as sharing of equipment between infected and noninfected farms, employees moving between infected and non-infected farms, lack of
cleaning and disinfection of vehicles moving between farms, and the presence of rodents
or small wild birds inside poultry houses. There also was evidence that virus was
transmitted through air from infected to non-infected farms (30).
Annual migration patterns of wild birds involved in HPAI H5N8 outbreaks
The phylogenetic analyses indicate that migrating wild birds carried HPAI H5N8
virus to North America and Europe in 2014/2015. Therefore, we reviewed the migratory
patterns of wild birds found positive for HPAI H5N8 virus (Table S3, S4, S6 and Fig.
S6).

5

Times and routes of migration are consistent with virus spread by migratory birds
via their breeding grounds. The best supported scenario is as follows: in winter
2013/2014, wild birds wintering in South Korea or possibly neighbouring unsampled
regions became infected; during spring migration, they transported the virus to northern
breeding grounds; in summer 2014, virus was maintained at northern breeding grounds
by serial infection of wild birds and/or virus persistence in water, and spread to wild birds
originating from other wintering areas; in autumn 2014, infected wild birds transported
the virus to wintering areas in North America and Europe. This scenario fits with the
synchronous detection of HPAI H5N8 or related viruses in these geographical areas in
November 2014.
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Fig. S1 (separate PDF file)
Time scaled Bayesian phylogenetic tree of the 219 multiple subtype HA sequences, with
sequence names and 95% highest posterior density confidence intervals for the internal
node heights (time to most recent common ancestors).
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Fig. S2
Number of NA-subtype changes with respect to HA trees per host type, normalised by
branch lengths. The dark coloured densities are for the original data (10 reconstructions
per tree, over 1000 trees), the pale colours are for trees with permuted host labels (10 per
tree, over 1000 trees). The dots represent the median values and the boxes show the
interquartile range. Host types are: Dom-ans (red): domestic anseriform birds, Dom-gal
(green): domestic galliform birds, Wild-Long (blue): long-distance migratory wild birds,
Wild-Short (purple): short-distance migratory wild birds. Numerical values of the
descriptive statistics are provided in Table S10.
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Fig. S3
Number of NA-subtype changes with respect to HA trees per combined host type and
region traits, normalised by branch lengths. The dark coloured densities are for the
original data (10 reconstructions per tree, over 1000 trees), the pale colours are for trees
with permuted host labels (10 per tree, over 1000 trees). The dots represent the median
values and the boxes show the interquartile range. Color key as for Fig. S2. Numerical
values of the descriptive statistics are provided in Table S10.
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Fig . S4
Posterior distributions of time to most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) of NA
sequences from Europe and North America with H5N8 subtype only, including Host type
reconstructions, based upon a posterior set of phylogenetic trees generated as in Fig 1.
Color key as for Fig. S2.
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Fig. S5
Host reconstructions at the TMRCA for H5N8 European and H5N8 North American
sequences (HA upper, NA lower), averaged over 1000 trees, showing original data (red
diamonds, from the constant population size trees; blue diamonds, from the skygrid
flexible population trees) and distribution of values from reconstructions using permuted
host labels (100 per tree over 1000 skygrid flexible population trees, pale colors). The
bars represent median values and the boxes show the interquartile range for the permuted
data. Color key as for Fig. S2.
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Fig. S6
Overview of possible migration routes of long-distance migratory wild water birds with
clade 2.3.4.4. HPAIV H5Nx in 2014 and early 2015. The map projection used is the
azimuthal equidistant projection, centered on the North Pole, which is marked with a +
sign. Arrows indicate the main known migration routes of each bird species after (South
Korea) or before (Europe and North-America) a HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4. H5Nx positive
sample was collected in 2014. Dashed colored lines indicate the migration patterns of
bird species of which certain populations of these birds are also sedentary (small circles).
(Eurasian coot: blue, Baikal teal: red, bean goose: yellow, greater white-fronted goose:
dark green, common teal: dark brown, tundra swan: purple, mallard: light green, Eurasian
wigeon: dark pink, American green-winged teal: light blue, northern pintail: black,
American wigeon: beige). The dark pink dot indicates the territory of Belaya Gora
settlement in Sakha Republic (Russia), where clade 2.3.4.4 HPAIV was detected in a
sample collected from a Eurasian wigeon. Relevant flyways of waders/shorebirds are
indicated with dashed light-grey lines.
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Table S1.
Global spread of clade 2.3.4.4 HPAIV A(H5N8) and A(H5N2) viruses.
Date of first

Geographical

Environment

Host species

Virus

Reference

report

location

May 2010

China

Live bird market

Domestic duck

HPAIV H5N8

(32)

January 2014

South Korea

Poultry farms

Multiple domestic

HPAIV H5N8

(33)

and wetlands

and wild birds

April 2014

Japan

Poultry farm

Chicken

HPAIV H5N8

(34)

September 2014

Sakha

Wild bird

Eurasian wigeon

HPAIV H5N8

(35)

Slaughterhouse

Domestic duck and

HPAIV H5N8

(18)

and wetland of

environmental

river

sample

Germany,

Poultry farms

Chicken, duck,

HPAIV H5N8

[ (20, 24,

Netherlands,

and wild birds

turkey

Republic
Russia
September 2014

November 2014

China

36–38)

U.K.
November 2014

Canada

Poultry farm

Chicken, turkey

HPAIV H5N2

(18, 39)

November 2014

Japan

Poultry farms

Chicken and wild

HPAIV H5N8

(18)

and wild birds

birds

December 2014

Italy

Poultry farm

Turkey

HPAIV H5N8

(38)

December 2014

USA

Backyard flock

Various

HPAIV H5N8

(18)

and wild birds

and H5N2

February 2015

Hungary

Poultry farm

Domestic duck

HPAIV H5N8

(18)

February 2015

Sweden

Wild birds;

Mute swan

HPAIV H5N8

(29)

central
Stockholm
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Table S2 (separate excel spread sheet file).
Time to Most Recent Common Ancestors (TMRCA) with probability of inferred
ancestral host-type (as percentage of trees with reconstructed host-type), overall
transition rate between host-types (host clock rate), branch length between the most
recent common ancestor and its ancestor, and number of expected host-type transitions
along this branch Each sub-table is repeated for HA and NA segments, constant
population size and skygrid trees and for the 4-host-state model (domestic anseriform,
domestic galliform, wild long-range migrants, wild short-range migrants), a 3-host-state
model (domestic anseriform, domestic galliform, wild) and an alternative 4-host-state
model (domestic anseriform, domestic galliform, wild anseriform, wild other).
In addition, the corresponding relative transition rates between host-types for each model
are provided.
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Table S3.
Overview of wild bird species in which clade 2.3.4.4 HPAIV H5N8 with known
sequence information were detected in 2014-early 2015.
Branch

Country

Wild bird species

Date of
sample
collection

Stage

IUCN status(40)

European
branch

South Korea

Eurasian coot (Fulica atra)

Jan-2014

wintering

Least concern

South Korea

Baikal teal (Anas formosa)

Jan-2014

wintering

Least concern

South Korea

Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos)

Feb-2014

sedentary/wintering

Least concern

South Korea

Goose (unknown species)

--

unknown

-

South Korea

Common teal (Anas crecca)

Mar-2014

wintering

Least concern

South Korea

Tundra swan (Cygnus
columbianus)

Feb-2014

wintering

Least concern

South Korea

Spot-billed duck (Anas
poecilorhyncha)

Feb-2014

wintering

Least concern

Russia

Eurasian wigeon (Anas penelope)

Sep-2014

breeding/autumn
migration

Least concern

Netherlands

Eurasian wigeon (Anas penelope)

Nov-2014

wintering

Least concern

Germany

Common teal (Anas crecca)

Nov-2014

autumn
migration/wintering

Least concern

Sweden

Mute swan (Cygnus olor)

Feb-2015

sedentary

Least concern

Germany

Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos)

Jan-2015

wintering/sedentary

Least concern

South Korea

Greater white-fronted goose
(Anser albifrons)

Jan-2014

wintering

Least concern

South Korea

Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos)

Jan-2014

wintering/sedentary

Least concern

South Korea

Bean goose (Anser fabalis)

Feb-2014

wintering

Least concern

South Korea

Baikal teal (Anas formosa)

Jan-2014

wintering

Least concern

South Korea

Common teal (Anas crecca)

Mar-2014

spring migration

Least concern

South Korea

Spot-billed duck (Anas
poecilorhyncha)

Dec-2014

sedentary

Least concern

South Korea

Gadwall (Anas strepera)

May-2014

sedentary or spring
migration

Least concern

Japan

Hooded crane (Grus monacha)
and White-naped crane (Grus
vipio)

Nov-2014 -

wintering

Vulnerable,
vulnerable

USA (Washington)

Gyrfalcon (Falco rusticolus)

Dec-2014

wintering

Least concern

USA (Washington)

American wigeon (Anas
americana)

Dec-2014

wintering

Least concern

USA (Washington)

Northern pintail (Anas acuta)

Dec-2014

wintering/autumn
migration

Least concern

USA (Washington)

Canada goose (Branta
canadensis)

Jan-2015

sedentary/wintering

Least concern

North
American
branch

Jan-2015
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Table S4.
Annual migration patterns of long-distance migratory wild bird species in which clade
2.3.4.4 HPAIV H5N8 was detected.
Region

Species

Analyzed data (1)

Wintering area

East Asia

Baikal teal
(Anas formosa)
Bean goose
(Anser fabalis)

Population

Japan, South
Korea and China
China, Korea,
Japan

East Asia

East Asia

Common teal
(Anas crecca)

East Asia

Greater white
fronted goose
(Anser
albifrons)
Tundra swan
(Cygnus
columbianus)

East Asia

Anser fabalis
middendorfi and
Anser fabalis
serrirostris
Particular
(sub)population,
known to change
between flyways
(2)
Subspecies

Whole species

Period of migration
to breeding area
Mid-March- early
April
Start nesting in earlyMay to early-June

Breeding area

South Korea

Late-February
(peaking in MarchApril)

Eastern part of
China, North and
South Korea,
Japan
East-Asia: east
part of China,
North and South
Korea, Japan
Northwestern
Europe

Start nesting in late
May

March-June

Referenc
e
(41)

Eastern Russia

October to
November

(43)

Arctic (subspecies A.a.
frontalis: Arctic tundra
from Lena delta east to
Russian Far east
Arctic

Late August to late
autumn

(44)

September to
October

(45)

Fennoscandia, the
Baltic states, northwest
Russia, northern
Poland, Germany and
Denmark
Fennoscandia and
European Russia

October to
November

(43, 46)

September to
November

(46, 47)

Eastern Siberia
Taiga zone located in
eastern Siberia to
Russian Far East

(42)

Northwestern
Europe

Common teal
(Anas crecca)

Population

Northwestern
Europe

Eurasian
wigeon (Anas
penelope)
American
wigeon (Anas
americana)

Population

Northwestern
Europe

March-May

Whole species

February-May

Northern part of the
USA, Alaska and
Canada

Late July- December

(48, 49)

Northern pintail
(Anas acuta)

Population

British Columbia
in Canada, the
near complete
United States,
Central America
and the West
Indies
British Columbia
in Canada, the
near complete
United States,
Central America
and the West
Indies

Late February- May

Northern part of the
USA, Alaska and
Canada

Mid-August onwards

(50, 51)

North America

North America

Late February
(peaking in MarchApril)

Period of migration
to wintering area
September to
November
September to
October

(1) When data about a particular population in an area were available, these data were
analyzed. This is indicated with ‘population’.
(2) Population has a very large range, different populations have different breeding and
wintering locations, species can also change between flyways.
(3) Populations in more temperate regions are sedentary.
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Table S5.
Overview of annual migration patterns of wild bird species in which clade 2.3.4.4.
HPAIV H5N8 was detected that migrate only over relatively short distances.
Region

Species

Analyzed

Comments

References

Spring migration route and exact site of location in summer are unknown. They most

(52)

data (1)
East Asia

Eurasian coot

Population

(Fulica atra)
East Asia

Gadwall (Anas

probably stay during spring and summer in the mainland of east or northern Asia.
Species

strepera)
East Asia

Mallard (Anas

White-naped

Population

Widely distributed. Northern breeding populations stay much further south in the winter.

Species

Breeds in Dauria on the border of Russia, Mongolia and China, the Amur and Ussuri

crane

basins on the Sino-Russian border and the Songnen and Sanjiang plains, China.

(Antigone

Migrates to its wintering grounds in the Yangtze basin, the Demilitarised Zone in North

Hooded crane

(46, 54)

Populations of temperate regions are more sedentary.

vipio)
East Asia

(53)

April and to their wintering grounds in July-August.

platyrhynchos)
East Asia

Partly sedentary. Northern breeding populations fly to their breeding grounds in March-

(55)

Korea/South Korea, and to southern Kyushu in Japan.
Species

Breeds in south-central and south-eastern Siberia, Russia. Breeding is suspected in

(Grus

Mongolia and two breeding sites have recently been found in the region of Heilongjiang,

monacha)

China. Majority of the population winters in Japan, with smaller numbers in China and

(56)

South Korea.
Northwestern Europe

Mallard (Anas

Population

platyrhynchos)
Northwestern Europe

Mute swan

Mallard (Anas

Species

Gyrfalcon

Essentially sedentary, or only locally migratory. Exchange between the NW/Central

(57)

European population and the Black Sea/Sea of Azov population.
Population

platyrhynchos)
North America

(46)

birds that breed in temperate regions are more sedentary.

(Cygnus olor)
North America

Partially migratory. Birds that breed in the northern part of Europe in general migratory,

Partially migratory. Birds that breed in the northern part are in general migratory, birds

(46)

that breed in temperate regions are more sedentary
Population

(Falco

Breeds in the far north part of Canada and Alaska and comes south in the winter to

(58)

Canada and the northern parts of the USA

rusticolus)
North America

Canada goose

Population

Large range, breeding in Canada, Alaska and northern parts of the USA, wintering in

(Branta

North America and Mexico. Also resident populations present in the USA, which live

canadensis)

south of the normal breeding range.

(59)

(1) When data about a particular population in an area were available, these data were
analyzed. This is indicated with ‘population’.
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Table S6.
Overview of field epidemiological and sequence analysis data of outbreaks of HPAIV
clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 among commercial poultry farms.
Country

Species
and farm
fattening
turkeys

City

Animals
on farm
31,000

Housing

Field epidemiological data

indoor

Barssel, district
Cloppenburg

19,200

indoor

fattening
ducks and
few hens
fattening
ducks

Neuborger,
district Emsland

about
11,000

indoor

Füzesgyarmat

22,000

indoor

Italy

fattening
turkeys

Porto Viro

35,000

indoor

Japan (April
2014)
Japan
(November
2014-January
2015
Japan
(November
2014-January
2015
Japan
(November
2014-January
2015
Japan
(November
2014-January
2015
Netherlands

broiler
chicken
chicken
broiler
breeders

Kuma-gun,
Kumamoto
Nobeoka-shi,
Miyazaki

113,100

indoor

Farm surrounded by fields and
forest and with restricted
access. Area with low poultry
density, about 1.3 km east of a
lake frequently visited by wild
birds. All surrounding poultry
holdings tested AIV negative.
All poultry in surveillance zone
tested AIV negative. Contact
tracing: all negative.
All poultry in surveillance zone
tested AIV negative. Contact
tracing: all negative.
No poultry have been moved
from the affected or contact
holdings to EU member states
or Third Countries. In the last 21
days the only transport was to a
slaughterhouse in Bekes
country. No transport to the
affected holding from outside
Hungary
Farm located in close proximity
to wetlands and marshlands,
wintering site for migratory birds
and wild waterfowl.
No data.

Germany

fattening
turkeys

Germany

4,031

indoor

No data.

(18)

chicken
broilers

Miyazaki-shi,
Miyazaki

42,030

indoor

No data.

(18)

chicken
broiler
breeders

Natato-shi,
Yamaguchi

33,017

indoor

No data.

(18)

chicken
broilers

Arita-cho,
Kumamoto

72,908

indoor

No data.

(18)

laying hens

Hekendorp

150,000

indoor

Netherlands

laying hens

Ter Aar

43,000

indoor

Netherlands

pulletrearing

Kamperveen

11,100

indoor

Netherlands

meat
ducks

Kamperveen

15,000

indoor

Farm situated next to a river and
in the middle of peat land, with
abundant presence of wild
waterfowl. All samples collected
in frame of the official control
system tested AIV negative.
Farm situated in an area with
abundance presence of
waterfowl.
Farm located on a stretch of
farmland boarded by a lake and
the Ijssel river. Large numbers
of wild waterfowl were present.
Farm located 550 m from the
other farm of Kamperveen.

Netherlands

layer hens

Zoeterwoude

29,000

indoor

No data available.

United
Kingdom
USA

breeding
ducks
turkey

6,000

indoor

145,000

indoor

USA

chickens
and ducks

Nafferton, East
Yorkshire
Stanislaus
County, California
Kings County,
California

114,000

indoor
(chickens)

Germany

Hungary

Heinrichswalde,
VorpommernGreifswald

Sequence
analysis data
No data related
other German
strains

Reference

No data related
other German
strains
No data related
other German
strains
Only outbreak in
this country

(19, 22)

Only outbreak in
this country

(26)

(19–21)

(19)

(28)

(18)

Separate
introduction

(23)

Separate
introduction

(23)

Separate
introduction

(23)

(23)

Contact tracing: all samples
tested AIV negative.
No data available.

Transmission
between farms
outbreak 3 >
outbreak 4)
Separate
introduction
Only outbreak in
this country
No data

No data available.

No data

(18)

(23)
(24, 25)
(18)
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Table S7.
Export and import of live domestic ducks and chickens from 2011 to 2013, in countries
affected by HPAI H5N8 virus outbreaks in 2014 and 2015 using data available from the
FAO (12).
Region
Country
North America Canada

Europe

Asia

1

Year
2013
2012
2011
USA
2013
2012
2011
Netherlands
2013
2012
2011
Hungary
2013
2012
2011
UK
2013
2012
2011
Italy
2013
2012
2011
Germany
2013
2012
2011
China
2013
2012
2011
Taiwan
2013
2012
2011
Japan
2013
2012
2011
South Korea
2013
2012
2011

Domestic ducks
Chickens
Export
Import
Export Import
1
1470
121
5874
60652
1397
78
6066
53397
972
134
6345
57099
500
822
87015
5350
593
620
84803
5551
901
82
80605
6020
1177
3680 330181
274401
998
1892 297854
290786
1
386 335475
296137
1781
232
70031
18116
1070
272
41174
18648
70
30
32194
12086
163
51
18652
11549
316
235
27739
9235
0
0
23922
13375
6
147
12435
9241
13
136
13728
8283
0
51
15169
6054
992
816 270858
166356
979
1496 290584
184023
476
218 254984
177549
0
68
7168
9867
0
76
7360
9786
0
77
7235
10173
0
9
0
298
0
0
0
236
0
3
0
352
5
0
557
no data
no data
6
0
784
no data
1000
0
772
0
139
3
608
0
319
0
624
0
1063
2
1036

x 1000 heads
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Table S8.
Host-type, subtype, and region distribution of sequence data sets.
Trait

H5NX HA 219

H5N8 HA 130

H5N8 NA 84

Number of sequences

219

130

84

Host-

Domestic anseriform

87

44

19

type

Domestic galliform

71

30

14

Wild long-range migrant

22

25

24

Wild sedentary or short-range migrant

39

31

27

H5N1

25

0

0

H5N2

33

0

0

H5N3

1

0

0

H5N5

9

0

0

H5N6

30

0

0

H5N8

121

130

84

East Asia

58

8

8

Europe

17

16

16

Japan

12

11

11

Korea

79

80

34

North America

33

15

15

South East Asia

20

0

0

Subtype

Region

Data Set
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Table S9 (separate excel spread sheet file).
Tables of HA and NA sequences used for phylogenetic analysis. These sequences consist
of 219 HA multiple subtype sequences from 2005-2015, 130 HA H5N8 sequences from
2010 to 2015 and 84 NA H5N8 sequences from 2010 to 2015. The tables contain the
subtype, host-type, phlyogeographic region trait, assumed latitude and longitude, and also
the accession numbers and submitter details from GISAID. We gratefully acknowledge
all authors, originating and submitting laboratories of the sequences from GISAID’s
EpiFlu™ Database on which this research is based, and those who have also submitted
their sequences to Genbank.

Table S10 (separate excel spread sheet file).
Numerical values of the descriptive statistics for the number of NA-subtype changes with
respect to HA trees per host type, normalised by branch lengths (Figure S2) and for the
number of NA-subtype changes with respect to HA trees per combined host type and
region traits, normalised by branch lengths (Figure S3).

Movie S1 (separate mp4 file)
Animation of Figure 2. Continuous trait phylogeographic reconstruction using 130 H5N8
HA sequences coloured by host-type reconstruction.
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